This paper examines the quantitative implications of government fiscal policy in a discrete-time one-sector growth model with a productive externality that generates social increasing returns to scale. Starting from a laissez-faire economy that exhibits local indeterminacy, we show that the introduction of a constant capital tax or subsidy can lead to various forms of endogenous fluctuations, including stable 2-, 4-, 8-, and 10-cycles, quasi-periodic orbits, and chaos. In contrast, a constant labor tax or subsidy has no effect on the qualitative nature of the model's dynamics. We show that the use of local steady-state analysis to detect the presence of multiple equilibria in this class of models can be misleading. For a plausible range of capital tax rates, the log-linearized dynamical system exhibits saddle-point stability, suggesting a unique equilibrium, while the true nonlinear model exhibits global indeterminacy. This result implies that stabilization policies designed to suppress sunspot fluctuations near the steady state may not prevent sunspots, cycles, or chaos in regions away from the steady state. Overall, our results highlight the importance of using a model's nonlinear equilibrium conditions to fully investigate global dynamics.
Introduction
It is well-known that a wide variety of equilibrium economic models can exhibit endogenous cycles, indeterminacy, sunspots, or chaos. 1 The conditions needed for such phenomena are typically less stringent in models with incomplete markets, imperfect competition, or externalities. These environments also create a motive for government intervention to address the source of the market failure. In this paper, we show how a government fiscal policy designed to address a wedge between the social and private marginal products of capital (which is created by a productive externality) can lead to a much richer set of endogenous dynamics than is possible in the laissez-faire economy.
The framework for our analysis is a discrete-time version of the one-sector growth model developed by Benhabib and Farmer (1994) . In one variant of their model, an individual firm's production process is subject to a positive external effect that is linked to the average level of inputs across all firms in the economy. Benhabib and Farmer show that when this externality is strong enough to generate social increasing returns-to-scale, the model can exhibit "local indeterminacy" whereby a continuum of rational expectations equilibria exists in the neighborhood of the single interior steady state. Such an environment allows for stochastic sunspot fluctuations driven by "animal spirits." 2 Farmer and Guo (1994) show that a calibrated version of this model compares favorably to a standard real business cycle model in being able to replicate some cyclical features of the postwar U.S. economy.
We begin our analysis of the Benhabib-Farmer-Guo model by solving for a benchmark fiscal policy that eliminates the wedge between the social and private marginal products of capital and labor. The benchmark policy involves constant subsidy rates applied to capital and labor incomes, financed by a lump-sum tax. We show that the subsidy rate applied to capital income is a key bifurcation parameter for the model's perfect-foresight dynamics. Starting from a laissez-faire economy that exhibits local indeterminacy, the nonlinear dynamical system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation as the capital subsidy rate becomes sufficiently positive and a flip bifurcation as the capital subsidy rate becomes sufficiently negative (representing a capital income tax). Both bifurcations are "supercritical," whereby an attracting orbit or cycle emerges as the subsidy rate passes a critical value. Pushing the subsidy rate beyond the critical value in either direction eventually leads to chaos. In these regions of the parameter space, the largest Lyapunov exponent of the nonlinear map becomes positive, indicating "sensitive dependence on initial conditions." Interestingly, the subsidy rate applied to labor income has no effect on the qualitative nature of the model's dynamics. This result is somewhat intuitive. The labor subsidy affects the tradeoff between consumption and leisure at a given date while the capital subsidy affects the tradeoff between consumption goods at different dates. The inter -temporal tradeoff is the crucial mechanism for generating multiple equilibria because agents' expectations of future returns must become self-fulfilling. 3 Similar logic helps to account for well-known importance of the discount factor and the capital depreciation rate (which both affect the intertemporal tradeoff) in growth models that exhibit complicated dynamics. 4 For our chosen calibration, the Hopf bifurcation occurs at a capital subsidy rate of 63.8 percent. This is below the benchmark subsidy rate of 66.7 percent needed to eliminate the wedge between the social and private marginal product of capital. Attempts by the government to encourage private investment by setting the capital subsidy at or near 66.7 percent will destabilize the steady state and allow for a much richer set of endogenous dynamics than is possible in the laissez-faire economy. In particular, as the subsidy rate is increased beyond the Hopf-bifurcation value of 63.8 percent, an attracting closed orbit (invariant circle) emerges to surround the steady state thereby allowing for quasi-periodic oscillations. Further increases in the subsidy rate cause the orbit to break up into a complicated chaotic attractor. The highsubsidy region is characterized by large intermittent spikes in hours worked which reflect a "bunching effect" in production as agents' decisions internalize more of the increasing returns.
The flip bifurcation occurs when gross income from capital is subsidized at the rate of -8.7 percent. This subsidy rate corresponds to a steady-state tax on capital income net of depreciation of 20.4 percent. As the capital tax rate increases, the model exhibits a series of period-doubling bifurcations-a typical route to chaos. In this region of parameter space, the substitution effect generated by expected movements in the after-tax interest rate overcomes the corresponding income effect by an amount that is sufficient to induce cycling in agents' optimal saving decisions. We observe stable 2-, 4-, and 8-cycles which eventually give way to narrow window of chaotic dynamics. Further increases in the capital tax lead to the emergence 3 Guo (1999) shows that a flat rate tax or subsidy applied to labor income does affect the dynamics in the continuous-time version of the model. This occurs because the clear distinction between intra-and intertemporal tradeoffs is lost as the time step becomes vanishingly small. 4 Mitra (1998) and Baierl, Nishimura, and Yano (1998) establish some conditions on the discount factor and the capital depreciation rate that are needed for complicated dynamics in optimal growth models. Becker (1985) shows that an economy with a capital income tax (or subsidy) can be modeled as an undistorted economy with a appropriately-defined discount factor. of a stable 10-cycle on the other side of the chaotic region.
For capital tax rates beyond the flip-bifurcation value, the steady state exhibits saddlepoint stability. An analysis based solely on the log-linearized model would lead one to conclude that a unique equilibrium exists in this region of the parameter space. It turns out, however, that local determinacy of equilibrium near the steady state coexists with global indeterminacy.
Away from the steady state, there exists a continuum of perfect-foresight trajectories leading to a stable n-period cycle or a chaotic attractor. It is possible, therefore, to construct stochastic sunspot equilibria away from the steady state, in the vicinity of the n-period cycle or attractor. 5 Finally, we demonstrate how the log-linearized model might be used to design a statecontingent capital subsidy/tax policy that guarantees saddle-point stability of the steadystate. This type of local control approach has been applied recently by Kass (1998) and He (1998, 1999) in reduced-form macroeconomic models, and by Guo and Lansing (1998) and Guo (1999) in continuous-time versions of the Benhabib-Farmer-Guo model. The important distinction here is that the model in question can exhibit global indeterminacy even in the presence of local determinacy. This result implies that stabilization policies designed to suppress sunspot fluctuations near the steady state may not prevent sunspots, cycles, or chaos in regions away from the steady state. Overall, our results highlight the importance of using a model's nonlinear equilibrium conditions to fully investigate global dynamics.
Before laying out the details of the model and the quantitative simulations, we briefly mention some other research that examines the relationship between government policy and endogenous fluctuations. Within this large literature, some researchers emphasize the use of fiscal or monetary policy for stabilization purposes while others show how policy may create an environment that is more conducive to these type of phenomena. These are two sides of the same coin.
In the area of fiscal policy, Kemp, Long, and Shimomura (1993) show that the optimal redistributive capital tax policy in a capitalist-worker model can generate endogenous cycles via a Hopf bifurcation. Bond, Wang, and Yip (1996) and Ben-Gad (2000) show that changes in the level of the capital income tax can induce indeterminate balanced growth paths in human-capital based endogenous growth models. Crès, Ghiglino, and Tvede (1997) show that internalization of a consumption externality in an overlapping generations economy (by means of government-sponsored legal entitlements) can generate endogenous cycles via a flip bifurcation. 6 Cases of global indeterminacy coexisting with local determinacy are quite common in models with multiple steady states or multiple balanced growth paths. 7 We are aware of only a handful of examples in models with a single interior steady state, such as ours. These are Cazzavillan (1996) , Venditti (1998), Grandmont, Pintus, and de Vilder (1998), and Pintus, Sands, and de Vilder (2000).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces fiscal policy into the Benhabib-Farmer-Guo model. Section 3 investigates the model's local and global dynamics with constant subsidy/tax rates. Section 4 discusses stabilization policy. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
The model economy consists of three types of agents: firms, households, and the government. Benhabib and Farmer (1994) describe two competitive decentralizations that lead to a social technology with increasing returns-to-scale. To simplify the exposition, we present the version of the model with a productive externality. 8 
Firms
There is a continuum of identical competitive firms with the total number normalized to one.
Each firm produces a homogenous final good using the following constant returns-to-scale technology:
where y t is the firm's output, k t and h t are the corresponding capital and labor inputs, and z t is the state of technology which the firm takes as given. The decision problem of an individual firm is max kt,ht
6 Other research that considers the role of fiscal policy as a stabilizing or de-stabilizing force includes: Farmer (1986), Reichlin (1986) , Schleifer (1986), Deneckre and Judd (1992), Boldrin (1992) , Evans and Honkapohja (1993) , Sims (1994) , Goenka (1994) , Cazzavillan (1996) , Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997), and Austin (1999) . Research that considers the role of monetary policy includes: Benhabib (1980) , Grandmont (1985 Grandmont ( , 1986 , Matsuyama (1991) , Foley (1992) , Sims (1994) , Smith (1994) , Woodford (1994) , Chattopadhyay (1996) , Matheny (1996) , Fukuda (1997) , Michener and Ravikumar (1998) , and Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001), among others.
7 See, for example, Benhabib and Perli (1994) , Greiner and Semmler (1996) , Evans, Honkapohja, and Romer (1998), Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga, and Pintus (1998), Christiano and Harrison (1999) , and, Benhabib, SchmittGrohé, and Uribe (2001), among others. 8 The alternative decentralization allows for monopoly power in the production of intermediate goods.
subject to equation (1) , where r t is the capital rental rate and w t is the real wage. Under the assumption that factor markets are perfectly competitive, profit maximization implies
In contrast to a standard real business cycle model where z t is governed by an exogenous stochastic process, the state of technology here is given by
where K t and H t are the economywide average input levels. 9 In a symmetric equilibrium, all firms take the same actions such that K t = k t and H t = h t . Hence we obtain the following social technology:
where
The social technology exhibits increasing returns-to-scale for η > 0. We restrict our attention to the case of α 1 < 1 which implies that the externality is not strong enough to generate sustained endogenous growth. 10 
Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical, infinitely-lived households, each endowed with one unit of time, who maximize a discounted stream of utilities over their lifetime:
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, c t is consumption, h t is hours worked and γ ≥ 0 denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply. We assume that there are no fundamental uncertainties present in the economy.
The budget constraint faced by the household is
9 Kamihigashi (1996) shows that the externality model is observationally equivalent to a standard real business cycle model from the standpoint of individual agents who view z t as being determined outside of their control. 10 Christiano and Harrison (1999) adopt the parameterization θ = 1/3 and η = 2 which yields α1 = 1. For this knife-edge case, the equilibrium marginal product of capital is independent of k t and the model's global dynamics collapse to a quadratic difference equation in ht and ht+1. Their setup yields two interior steady states (a sink and a saddle) in contrast to our model which possesses a single interior steady state.
where i t is investment and k t is the household's stock of physical capital. Households derive income by supplying capital and labor services to firms. Fiscal policy is introduced through the variables s kt, s ht , and T t , which represent the subsidy rates applied to capital and labor incomes, and a lump-sum tax, respectively. Under this formulation, negative subsidy rates represent distortionary taxes and a negative value of T t represents a lump-sum transfer received from the government. 11 Households view r t , w t , s kt , s ht, and T t as being determined outside of their control.
Investment adds to the stock of capital according to the law of motion
where δ ∈ [0, 1) is the constant depreciation rate. We exclude δ = 1 because this case is not subject to indeterminacy in a regime of constant subsidy/tax rates. In particular, when combined with logarithmic utility and a Cobb-Douglas production technology, the assumption of 100 percent depreciation yields exactly offsetting income and substitution effects so that households only need to observe the current state the economy to decide how much to consume and invest. In this case, there exists a closed-form solution where equilibrium allocations are uniquely pinned down by current-period fundamentals, regardless of the degree of increasing returns. 12 The first-order conditions for the household's optimization problem are given by
Equation (10) equates the household's marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure to the after-subsidy real wage. Equation (11) is the consumption Euler equation, and equation (12) is the transversality condition.
11 Since s kt is applied to gross income from capital, a negative subsidy rate is equivalent to a tax on capital income net of depreciation of τ kt = 1 −
, where s kt < 0 and δ is the capital depreciation rate. 12 When δ = 1, the equilibrium decision rules are:
, where y t is given by equation (6) and s k and s h are the constant subsidy/tax rates.
Government
The government sets {s kt , s ht , T t } ∞ t=0 , subject to the following budget constraint:
By combining equations (6), (8), (9), and (13), we obtain the following aggregate resource constraint for the economy:
3 Dynamics with Constant Subsidy/Tax Rates
The increasing-returns technology (6) introduces a nonconvexity into the constraint set of the social planner's problem. 13 This nonconvexity presents a formidable technical barrier for policy analysis because it precludes application of the Kuhn-Tucker sufficiency theorem to (i) compute the first-best allocations and (ii) solve for the optimal fiscal policy that would implement the first-best as a competitive equilibrium. This barrier cannot be surmounted simply by resorting to a numerical analysis. A complete characterization of the first-best allocations in a dynamic economy with increasing returns is an unsolved problem that we leave as an open question for future research. 14 As an alternative to computing the optimal fiscal policy, we consider the following benchmark fiscal policy that eliminates the wedge between the social and private marginal products of capital and labor.
Proposition. The wedge between the social and private marginal products of capital and labor is eliminated when
T t = ηy t, for all t.
Proof : The social marginal products from equation (6) are ∂y t ∂kt = α 1 y t /k t and ∂y t ∂ht = α 2 y t /k t . The after-subsidy private marginal products are (1 + s kt )r t and (1 + s ht )w t , where r t and w t are given by equations (3) and (4). With s kt = s ht = η, we have (1 + s kt ) r t = α 1 y t /k t and (1 + s ht ) w t = α 2 y t /k t . The lump-sum tax needed to finance the subsidies follows directly from equation (13) . 13 The social planner chooses {c t , h t , k t+1 } ∞ t=0 to maximize (7) subject to equation (14) , with k 0 given. 14 Gaines and Peterson (1985) show existence but not uniqueness of the first-best allocations in a growth model with increasing returns-to-scale. Dechert and Nishimura (1983) establish some features of the first-best allocations when the technology exhibits increasing returns-to-scale for an initial range of capital stocks but decreasing returns thereafter.
The benchmark policy involves constant subsidy rates that are linked directly to the externality parameter η. A similar result is obtained in models where the productive externality (or the degree of monopoly power) does not give rise to increasing returns. In those models, unlike here, the Kuhn-Tucker sufficiency theorem can be used to show that the benchmark fiscal policy implements the unique first-best allocations. 15 We now turn to a quantitative investigation of the model's local and global dynamics under a regime of constant subsidy/tax rates, that is, when s kt = s k and s ht = s h for all t.
Calibration
Parameter values are chosen based on empirically observed features of the U.S. economy. The time period in the model is taken to be one year. Table 1 summarizes the baseline parameter values, together with a brief description of the rationale used in their selection. Despite these findings, Basu and Fernald (1997, Section V) note that the uncorrected aggregate estimates may actually be more appropriate for calibrating models (such as ours) that abstract from heterogeneity in production and assume a single representative firm. This argument turns out to be helpful for our purposes because it is well-known that one-sector growth models of the type considered here require strong increasing returns for indeterminacy.
Given the other baseline parameter values, our model requires returns-to-scale in excess of approximately 1.6 to exhibit local indeterminacy (a point which is discussed further below in reference to Figure 1 18 To the extent that one objects to our returnsto-scale calibration, the quantitative experiments reported below should be viewed more from a methodological perspective as illustrating the pitfalls that can arise from focusing exclusively on log-linearized dynamics rather than considering the model's true nonlinear equilibrium conditions. 19 
Log-Linearized Dynamics
In the appendix, we show that the perfect-foresight version of the model can be approximated by the following log-linear dynamical system:
wherek andc represent steady-state values and J is a 2 × 2 Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives evaluated at the steady state. The elements of J are constructed using the constants λ i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4 which represent combinations of the model parameters θ, β, δ, γ, η, and s k .
The first-order dynamical system possesses one predetermined variable: k t . The eigenvalues of J determine the stability of the log-linear system. The labor subsidy rate s h does not appear in J and thus has no affect on the model's local stability properties. The household equilibrium conditions provide some intuition for this result. Equation (10) shows that s h affects the tradeoff between consumption and leisure at a given date while equation (11) shows that s k affects the tradeoff between consumption goods at different dates. The intertemporal tradeoff is the crucial mechanism for generating multiple equilibria because agents'
expectations of future returns must become self-fulfilling. 20 Table 2 summarizes the model's local stability properties as we vary the capital subsidy rate s k over a wide range. 
Local Indeterminacy
When both eigenvalues of J lie inside the unit circle, the steady state is indeterminate (a sink) and the economy is subject to the same type of stochastic sunspot fluctuations as in the original Benhabib-Farmer-Guo model. Figure 1 plots the combinations of η (the externality parameter) and s k (the capital subsidy rate) that allow for local indeterminacy. Recall that the degree of returns-to-scale in the model economy is given by 1 + η. When η = 0 (constant returns-toscale), the model exhibits saddle-point stability for all values of s k . From the figure, we see that η > 0.5937 is needed for the steady state to become a sink. Given η > 0.5937, increases in s k eventually transform the steady state into a source while decreases in s k eventually transform the steady state into a saddle point. For our calibration with η = 2/3 0.6667, local indeterminacy occurs for subsidy rates in the range −0.0869 < s k < 0.6380. The model exhibits a locally unique equilibrium (a saddle point) for s k < −0.0869. This subsidy rate corresponds to a steady-state tax on capital income net of depreciation of τ k = 0.2042. 21 20 However, as mentioned in footnote 3, this intuition does not extend to the continuous-time version of the model because there is no clear distinction between the intra-and inter-temporal tradeoffs when the time step becomes vanishingly small. 21 See footnote 11. Auerbach (1996) estimates the effective marginal tax rate on capital income under the current U.S. tax code. He obtains an estimate of 0.26 for nonresidential capital and 0.06 for residential capital.
Hence, a government that wishes to stabilize the economy against sunspot fluctuations near the steady state can do so simply by imposing a sufficiently high tax rate on capital income.
As we shall see, however, such a policy can open the door to other forms of endogenous fluctuations-those arising from global indeterminacy.
Hopf Bifurcation
For our calibration, the dynamical system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation as s k is increased past the value s Hopf k = 0.6380. The eigenvalues of J are complex conjugates and cross the unit circle with non-zero speed. 22 The steady state changes stability from a sink to a source and a closed orbit (invariant circle) emerges to surround the steady state. At the bifurcation point, we have det(J) = 1. 23 Using the expression for det(J) derived in the appendix, we solve for the following bifurcation value:
where ρ ≡ 1 β − 1 is the household's rate of time preference. Since the externality parameter η enters equation (18) in a multiplicative way, it is not immediately obvious whether the Hopf bifurcation occurs above or below the benchmark subsidy rate s k = η derived earlier in Section 3. For our calibration, it turns out that s Hopf k < η. 24 Thus, attempts by the government to close the wedge between the social and private marginal products of capital by setting s k at or near η = 2/3 will destabilize the steady state and allow for a much richer set of endogenous dynamics than is possible in the laissez-faire economy.
While the Hopf bifurcation theorem proves the existence of a closed orbit, it does not tell us whether the orbit is stable. There are two cases to consider. In a supercritical Hopf bifurcation, an attracting orbit emerges on the side of s as a stylized business cycle while a repelling orbit accompanied by an attracting steady-state resembles the "corridor of stability" concept described by Leijonhufvud (1973) . 25 It is possible to distinguish between the two cases analytically by implementing a coordinate transformation and examining the sign of a coefficient in the third-order Taylor series expansion of the transformed dynamical system. 26 Since the calculation is extremely tedious, we resort to numerical simulations to establish that the Hopf bifurcation in our model is supercritical. 27 The supercritical Hopf bifurcation allows the model to exhibit deterministic, quasi-periodic oscillations that never converge to the steady state. Moreover, because the invariant circle is an attractor, there exists a continuum of perfect-foresight trajectories each leading to the circle. It is possible, therefore, to construct stochastic sunspot equilibria in the vicinity of the circle that remain away from the steady state. This is a form of global indeterminacy.
Flip Bifurcation
For our calibration, the dynamical system undergoes a flip bifurcation as s k is reduced past the value s 
As with the Hopf bifurcation, there are two cases to consider regarding stability. In a supercritical flip bifurcation, an attracting two-cycle emerges on the side of s Drugeon and Venditti (2001) . 27 Our method of verifying stability avoids a potential pitfall of the analytical calculation. Kind (1999) shows that the third-order Taylor series coefficient may indicate a subcritical Hopf bifurcation (normally associated with a repelling orbit) when in fact an attracting outer orbit surrounds the repelling inner orbit. This phenomena is described as a "crater" bifurcation. 28 For a formal description of the flip bifurcation (which can only occur in discrete time), see Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983) , pp 156-160. 29 See Azariadis (1993), p. 93.
analytical calculation can be used to distinguish between the two cases, we again resort to numerical simulations to establish that the flip bifurcation in our model is supercritical. 30 The supercritical flip bifurcation allows the model to exhibit deterministic cycles that never converge to the steady state. The two-cycle is an attractor, so it is possible to construct stochastic sunspot equilibria in the vicinity of the cycle that remain away from the steady state-another form of global indeterminacy. In this case, the global indeterminacy coexists with local determinacy because the steady state is a saddle point for s k < −0.0867. This result implies that stabilization policies designed using the log-linearized model may backfire.
In particular, setting s k < −0.0867 to suppress sunspot fluctuations near the steady state can open the door to sunspots, cycles, or even chaos, in regions away from the steady state. We will return to this point later in Section 4 in our discussion of local control policies.
Nonlinear Dynamics
In the appendix, we show that the model's perfect-foresight dynamics are governed by the following nonlinear map:
To investigate the global dynamics, we iterate the above map for a range of values of s k , holding s h = 0. 31 The iteration proceeds as follows. Given k 0 and an arbitrarily chosen c 0 , we solve equation (20) for k 1. Substituting the value of k 1 into equation (21) our model is deterministic, the qualitative properties of the nonlinear map should be robust to the introduction of small stochastic disturbances. 32 It is possible, therefore, to construct 30 The analytical calculation is described by Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983) , pp 156-160. For an example, see Becker and Foias (1994) . 31 Although s h does not affect the model dynamics, it does affect the range of values of h t observed during the simulations. We set s h = 0 to ensure h t ≤ 1, consistent with our assumption of a time endowment normalized to one. 32 This has been demonstrated formally using the discrete logistic map by Crutchfield, Farmer, and Huberman (1982). Benhabib and Nishimura (1989) show that a stable two-cycle in a deterministic economy generalizes to the concept of "cyclic sets" in an economy subject to stochastic shocks. Although not plotted separately, the model exhibits stable 2-4-and 8-cycles for subsidy rates in the range −0.133 < s k < s
F lip k
. While theory tells us that there are an infinite number of period-doublings in the cascade, the corresponding intervals of s k are too narrow for the higher integer cycles to be observed in the bifurcation diagram. In Figure 9 , we see that another type of chaotic attractor emerges when the subsidy rate is reduced to s k = −0.13435. Figure 10 shows that a stable 10-cycle emerges when the subsidy rate is further reduced to
Changes in s k affect the amplitude of the cycles or oscillations. The high-subsidy region is characterized by large intermittent spikes in hours worked and output which reflect a "bunching effect" in production as agents' decisions internalize more of the increasing returns. In the negative-subsidy region, the substitution effect generated by expected movements in the aftertax interest rate overcomes the corresponding income effect by an amount that is sufficient to induce cycling in agents' optimal saving decisions. These stable cycles can only be observed in 
Stabilization Policy

Welfare Implications
Given the model's susceptibility to endogenous fluctuations, it is natural to ask whether the government should try to stabilize the economy through some type of activist fiscal policy.
Standard second-best analysis tells us that there is no definitive answer to this normative question. In our model, a fluctuating economy and its stabilized counterpart will both be Pareto-inferior due to the presence of the productive externality. A priori, we cannot rank these economies from a welfare standpoint. Monte Carlo simulations are unlikely to settle the matter because the results will depend on the assumed fiscal policy in the baseline economy (which governs the nature of the endogenous fluctuations to be stabilized) and the assumed variance of a sunspot shock (which can be present whenever the baseline economy exhibits local or global indeterminacy). Welfare questions are further complicated by our lack of knowledge regarding the first-best allocations for this economy. In other environments, the first-best allocations provide an important benchmark for judging the desirability of stabilization policy. 34 Finally, we note that Grandmont (1985) makes a case for stabilization policy even when endogenous fluctuations are Pareto-optimal. He argues that complicated endogenous dynamics may prevent agents from learning enough about their environment to support convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium. 35 In light of the many complex issues affecting the desirability of stabilization policy for this economy, we restrict our attention to questions of feasibility. In what follows, we describe some policy mechanisms that can suppress sunspot fluctuations near the steady state.
Local Control
Here we demonstrate how the log-linearized model might be used to design a state-contingent capital subsidy/tax policy that selects a locally unique equilibrium by ensuring saddle-point stability of the steady-state. To design the policy, we first replace the constant subsidy rate s k in the Euler equation (21) with its state-contingent counterpart s kt+1 . Assuming that households view the subsidy rate as being determined outside of their control, we can construct the following modified version of (17):
where λ 5 = β (ρ + δ) ands k represents the steady-state subsidy rate. Our decision to linearize around ln (1 +s k ) , as opposed to ln (s k ) , allows for negative subsidy rates and maintains the elements of J unchanged from before. Now consider a local control policy of the form
where d 1 and d 2 are control parameters that govern the response of s kt to the lagged state variables k t−1 and c t−1 . Updating (23) by one time-step and substituting into (22) yields
The basic idea behind local control is to choose d 1 and d 2 such that the above log-linear system exhibits saddle point stability. This requires one eigenvalue of J 1 to lie inside the unit circle and the other eigenvalue to lie outside. Figure 11 plots Some applications of local control have appeared recently in the indeterminacy literature.
We briefly discuss some examples that are closely related to our analysis. Guo and Lansing (1998) show that a progressive income tax can ensure saddle-point stability of the steady state in a continuous-time version of the present model. Specifically, they consider a tax policy of the form
where τ t is the tax rate, φ is the slope of the tax schedule, and y t is current output. Since the log-linearized equilibrium conditions can be used to express y t in terms of k t−1 , c t−1 , and τ t , equation (25) can be viewed as a special case of equation (23) . 36 Georges (1995) shows that adjustment costs applied to jump variables can be used to select a locally unique equilibrium. One application of this idea, discussed by Wen (1998b), is a time-to-build capital accumulation technology. Similarly, explicit adjustment costs for capital investment can be used to select a locally unique equilibrium. To see how this works, consider an economy where the household budget constraint (8) is replaced by the following laissez-faire version:
where i t = k t+1 − (1 − δ) k t and ψ ≥ 0. Following Abel and Blanchard (1983), adjustment costs are modeled here as a premium τ t (·) paid for each unit of investment goods relative to consumption goods. From equation (26) , adjustment costs are observationally equivalent to a state-contingent tax on investment; households internalize the impact of their actions on the tax rate and tax revenues are simply thrown away. The adjustment cost parameter ψ now serves as a bifurcation parameter for the model's perfect-foresight dynamics. For our calibration, the dynamical system undergoes a flip bifurcation as ψ is increased past the value ψ F lip = 0.3689. At this point, the steady state changes stability from a sink to a saddle and a two-cycle emerges with points on either side of the steady state.
The above examples show that there are many ways to select a locally unique equilibrium.
Nevertheless, these examples suffer from the drawback of being based on a log-linear approximation. When global indeterminacy coexists with local determinacy as it can here, equilibrium selection mechanisms designed using the approximating model may prove unsuccessful when introduced into the true nonlinear model. 37 
Conclusion
This paper has shown that the introduction of a constant capital tax or subsidy in the Benhabib-Farmer-Guo model can lead to a much richer set of endogenous dynamics than is possible in the laissez-faire version of the model. The nonlinear dynamical system undergoes a
Hopf bifurcation as the capital subsidy rate becomes sufficiently positive, and a flip bifurcation as the capital subsidy rate becomes sufficiently negative (representing a capital income tax).
The model's perfect-foresight dynamics allow for stable 2-, 4-, 8-, and 10-cycles, quasi-periodic orbits, and chaos. None of these phenomena can be observed in the log-linearized version of the model. For a plausible range of capital tax rates, local determinacy of equilibrium near the steady state coexists with global indeterminacy. This implies that stabilization mechanisms designed using a log-linearized model may not prevent cycles, sunspots, or chaos away from the steady state. Overall, our results caution against the use of local steady-state analysis to make inferences about the global behavior of a nonlinear economic model. 37 In the working paper version of this article, Guo and Lansing (1999b), we show how the nonlinear equilibrium conditions might be used to design a state-contingent fiscal policy that selects a globally unique equilibrium. The global stabilization policy creates an environment where the income and substitution effects of future interest rate movements exactly cancel out. As a result, equilibrium allocations are uniquely pinned down by current-period fundamentals, regardless of the degree of increasing returns.
A Appendix
This appendix summarizes the equations used to investigate the model's perfect-foresight dynamics under a regime of constant subsidy/tax rates where s kt = s k and s ht = s h for all t.
The equilibrium conditions are: For the parameter values in Table 1 , it is straightforward to show that the above economy exhibits a unique interior steady state. Equation (A.2) implies h t = A (1+s h )(1−θ) c t k α 1 t 1 α 2 −1−γ which can be used to eliminate h t from equations (A.1) and (A.3) thus yielding equations (20) and (21) in the text.
In the vicinity of the steady state, equations (20) and (21) can be approximated by the following log-linear dynamical system: 4) where the elements that make up the Jacobian matrix J are given by: 
